Observers of the open source phenomenon often compare the production and management of open source code to the 'open science' process of peer review (Dalle and David, 2003; Kogut and Meitu, 2002; Raymond, 1999) where work and method are critically evaluated with informed skepticism (Merton, 1973; Latour & Woolgar, 1979) . Since code contributions are communicated through public mailing lists, the development process is open to comment from any reader. However, long-term contributors who have made valuable code commitments to open source projects earn the respect of their peers over time. New entrants must prove themselves by contributing code and providing joining scripts that demonstrate their commitment to the project (von Krogh, Spaeth, and Lakhani, 2003) . Technical decisions are negotiated among those knowledgeable and confident enough to voice their opinions. how to maintain vendor neutrality in the face of increasing industry support (O'Mahony, 2002 ). This challenge is one that, in the last decade, has also become familiar to academic research institutions.
For example, many legal, economic and organizational scholars have become concerned that critical distinctions between public (or 'open') and private science have become blurred (Dasgupta and David, 1994) . Scholars are examining how the recent passage of the Bayh Dole Act, which permits an expanded role for universities in licensing their research for commercial purposes, has affected the funding, conduct, use and dissemination of university research (Owen-Smith, 2003; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003; Mowery and Sampat, 2001; Mowery and Ziedonis, 2002) . Of concern is whether the norms of open public science are compromised when university endeavors cross scholarly and commercial boundaries.
Most scholars agree that commercial support of university research is an imperative as public support for it has declined (Mowery and Sampat, 2004) . The question is how a more integrated commercial and academic regime (Owen-Smith, 2003) can prosper without unduly influencing academic research in a direction that is not particular to one firm. Thus, sustaining openness and pluralism without risking cooptation from commercial entities is a concern for both academic scientists and open source communities.
But, open source projects lack the strong institutional and professional structures academe provides to guide training and access to the profession. Open source projects that are community founded are not managed with formal authority relations. Although open source communities are guided by powerful norms that reinforce or discourage certain types of online behavior, few have deep experience developing formal social structures.
Communal and directly democratic organizations often have difficulty scaling (Whyte & Whyte, 1988; Rothschild-Whitt, 1979; Rothschild and Russell, 1986; Rothschild and Whitt, 1986 ), but community managed projects face a more complex dilemma.
For community managed projects to sustain themselves, not only must their informal social structures mature to support more contributors, but they must also ensure pluralism while encouraging collective action toward a common goal. Unlike cooperatives, unions, kibbutz, and social movement organizations that often reinforce homogeneity among their members (e.g. Kanter, 1968) , community managed projects derive their technical and social strength from the diversity of the social, geographic and technical environments of their contributors. Differences in talents, opinions, and computing environments helps contributors identify unique problems and solutions that fosters a more robust technical product -that is one that can be used reliably by a broader user base (Tuomi, 2003; Waynor, 2000; Raymond, 1999) .
Diversity in perspectives and contributions enhances the resilience of community developed software, but contributors must share a common goal in the project's success as a non-commercial entity. As the number of contributors to community managed projects increases, so too does the diversity of contributor skill and motivation. In a completely open environment, not all contributors may have the project's best interests in mind. Under these conditions, maintaining the quality of code and ascertaining the motivations of contributors has become a concern for some community managed projects (Michlmayr and Hitt, 2003) .
The potential for someone to co-opt or hijack a project or unwittingly introduce code owned by someone else looms large.
In the next section we unpack some of the changes in the management of boundaries between university and commercial science. Then, with qualitative and quantitative network data, we explore how one non-commercial community managed software project, the Debian project, developed a membership process to manage its boundaries with the public and commercial world and how its social network affected this process.
Managing the Boundary Between Open and Commercial Science. The realms of open science
and commercial science are interdependent but distinct knowledge systems that diverge in their reward systems and in their dissemination and use of that knowledge (Dasgupta and David, 1994) . The logic of open science assumes that the production of science is a public endeavor (David, 2000; and is characterized by norms that encourage universalistic standards based on competence or merit (Merton, 1973) . The practice of open science demands full disclosure of methods and findings, to allow scientists to replicate and verify each other's work (Merton 1973; Latour & Woolgar, 1979) . While the goal of commercial investment in science is to increase the stream of rents that can accrue from rights to private knowledge, the goal of open science is to add to the stock of public knowledge (Dasgupta and David, 1994) .
Instead of property rights, scientists are granted priority for discoveries made. This provides scientists with an incentive to share their discoveries early, helping scientists to avoid duplication and advance the field more rapidly. The institutional foundations of open science emerged in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth century Europe when intellectual endeavors began to receive support from the state as opposed to patronage from elites (David, 2000) . Public support was crucial to fostering a climate of open intellectual inquiry without concern for property rights. David has argued however that the institutional framework supporting public science remains fragile and can be undermined if too great an emphasis is placed on property right protections (2000).
There is suggestive evidence that the blurring of commercial and university science boundaries has, in the last twenty years, had some effects. Between 1981 and 1998, OwenSmith found that science conducted at 89 of the most research intensive US universities became increasingly affected by commercial concerns, standards and rewards (2003) .
Careful empirical analysis shows that university patenting experience positively affected the visibility or impact of academic work after 1983 (Owen-Smith, 2003) . Further examination of these same 89 US universities shows that university technology licensing offices play a critical role in assessing the commercial impact of basic research (Owen-Smith and Powell, 2003) . Universities that were well connected to industry had patent portfolios with greater impact, but these relationships reached a point of diminishing returns. Technology licensing offices that were too closely tied to industry had less innovative patent portfolios (OwenSmith and Powell, 2003) . The suggestion that university research has become more applied in orientation due to the management of boundaries with commercial entities simultaneously highlights the importance and fragility of the balance between public and private institutional frameworks in the production of new knowledge.
Open Source Software: New Challenges. Amidst a changing regulatory climate for academic and industry collaboration, software programmers from around the world have collaborated to produce commercial grade open source software that is freely available, modifiable and distributable, and yet protected from proprietary appropriation. Software protected by licenses such as the GNU General Public License (GPL), assures potential collaborators that their efforts will not, in the future, become absorbed into proprietary software (Stallman, 1999) . Other works derived from GNU GPL licensed software must be guided by the same terms. This foundation provides a common platform for collaboration 1 Krogh, Spaeth, and Lakhani, 2003; Michlmayr and Hitt, 2003) . In their study of the FreeNet project, von Krogh et al (2003) On an open source project, the vast majority of coding and communication activities are publicly accessible and the software produced can be downloaded for free. But, access rights to the code base must be managed so as not to jeopardize its security. Unlike virtual organizations or online communities that are often described as having fluid boundaries and potentially anonymous, shifting members and identities, members of open source projects must maintain a trusted identity in order to gain the ability to contribute directly to a project's code base. Membership can be fluid, but it cannot be indeterminate. Members may not always maintain consistent activity rates, but the allocation of access rights or developer accounts must be known and distinguishable. Since contributors may never meet each other, they face a unique problem: how to verify the identities of individuals distributed around the world. Powell (1990) theorized that network forms may face novel problems of control and that membership in a community may require new organizational practices (Powell et al, 1996: 142) . Our research on community managed projects identifies a novel array of practices designed to foster trust and identity authentication. to show that a public key belongs to owner and is represented by the user id packet (Brennen, 2003) . This certification does not provide assurance as to the authenticity of their identification documents, but provides assurance that a particular identity is assigned to a particular key (Network Associates, 1990) .
In a globally distributed environment, where everyone cannot meet everyone else, responsibility for validating public keys is delegated to trusted others. In technical communities, key signers are explicitly encouraged to consider not only their own security requirements, but the interests of others who may rely on their judgment (Free Software Foundation, 1999) .
"Key signing has two main purposes: it permits you to detect tampering on your keyring, and it allows you to certify that a key truly belongs to the person named by a user ID on the key. Key signatures are also used in a scheme known as the web of trust to extend certification to keys not directly signed by you but signed by others you trust" (Free Software Foundation, 1999: 13) ."
Certificates provide validation, but people are trusted to be judicious in the way they validate the certificates of others. A 'web of trust' is a collection of key signings that allows people to rely upon third party verification of other's public keys. The web of trust assumes that the more people who have signed each other's key (the greater the density of the network), the more reliable is the information authenticated. "The more deep and tightly inter-linked the web of trust is, the more difficult it is to defeat" (Brennen, 2003) . There is no limit to the number of people that can sign a key.
One way individuals have their keys signed is by hosting or attending a 'key signing party': a get-together for the purpose of signing each other's keys. At a key-signing party, a small group of individuals will bring a copy of their public key and valid photo identification, meet and certify each others' public keys. After a key is signed it can then be placed on a central key server that may be maintained by a 'keyring coordinator'. Key signing parties are viewed as critical to enhancing the web of trust, to teaching people about the benefits of cryptography, and to building technical communities (Brennan, 2003) .
[P]lease don't sign keys of people you did not personally identify. If you don't take this process seriously, you are a weak link in the Web of Trust. If I see that you signed the key of someone who wasn't at the event, I won't sign your key, and I'll suggest that others don't either (Key Signing Party Organizer, July 8, 2001 ).
As this party organizer explains, violation of key signing protocols can lead to sanctioning and possible estrangement by other members of the group. Signing someone's key without physical verification of his or her identity breaches the norms of the community and threatens the validity of the web of trust. If someone is viewed as lax in their security requirements, their ability to maintain the respect of their peers will be compromised.
Despite the fact that the distributed setting of an open source project implies the existence of powerful social networks, a social network approach has yet to be used to explain the evolution of its social structure. Using cryptography data from the keyring of the Debian project, we examine the evolution of its social network over a five-year period (1997 -2001) to assess how changes in its structure affect the design of membership mechanisms.
Debian produces the largest and most popular non-commercial Linux operating system distribution and has been in existence for over ten years. mechanisms that can affect future growth of the network. These results confirm that organizational design and social network dynamics are intertwined, and that the former cannot be ignored when attempting to understand the emergence of new social orders.
Methods
The Debian project began using public key encryption as a way to build trust and authenticate member identities in 1994. This method became, in the spring of 2000, a condition for becoming a project member. Since each key signing is dated and requires a face to face meeting, these data indicate when individual project members met each other.
The data we collected from the Debian keyring consist of gpg and pgp keys signed by dyads between 1994 and 2002. The keyring network was only minimally active during the project's first two years (1994 -1996) . Thus, we begin our analysis at the beginning of 1997 when key signing started to become more widely adopted. Table 1 reports the number of developers in the keyring, the rate of growth of the nodes in the network, the number of ties between members, average degree (number of keys signed or people met), standard deviation of degree, number of components, and density of the network from 1997 to 2002.
From the project developer database, we identified the continent of residence for each developer and leadership positions, if any, held over time. In Table 2 , we summarize data on the continent of residence with three dummy variables (Europe, North America, and
Other) as well as other descriptive statistics such as packages maintained, tenure and degree Similar to prior studies of the Apache, FreeNet and GNOME projects, a small fraction of maintainers contribute the majority of the work (von Krogh et al, 2003; Mockus, Fielding and Herbsleb, 2000; 2002; Koch and Schneider, 2000) . which is the number of other developers each one of them has met face-to-face 3 .
In order to understand this data in the context of the project's evolution, 76
informants from the open source community at large were interviewed, six of them in leadership positions within Debian. Online documentation such as mailing list archives, meeting notes, and other formal project documents offered an additional source of data. We also used Pajek software (Batageli and Mrvar, 1998) 4 to generate a replicable visualization of the network of Debian developers. The drawings were constructed with the Kamada-Kawai algorithm, which locates connected nodes adjacent to one another and sets the physical distance between nodes as a function of the shortest path between them. The distances between unconnected portions of the network are undefined in this algorithm, and therefore the relative position of different components does not have substantive meaning (KamadaKawai, 1989) . To show how the structural position of the developers affected the composition of the New Maintainer Committee, we estimated a logit model (Long, 1997) , testing whether degree centrality in the network affected this outcome in 2001-2002, after controlling for level and criticality of contribution, tenure in the project and geographic location.
Debian's Evolving Membership Process
Project Initiation. On August 16, 1993, the founder of Debian proposed developing an easily installable packaged version of the GNU 5 /Linux operating system to a Usenet newsgroup. He wanted to create a complete operating system that would be 'commercial grade' but not commercial, and be managed differently from the Linux kernel project.
Rather than being developed by one isolated individual or group, as other distributions of Linux have been in the past, 6 Debian is being developed openly in the spirit of Linux and GNU. The primary purpose of the Debian project is to finally create a distribution that lives up to the Linux name […] . It is also an attempt to create a non-commercial distribution that will be able to effectively compete in the commercial market (Murdock, 1994) .
About two-dozen people responded to the posting and the founder created a new mailing list specific for this project named "Debian."
7 Between 1993 and 1996, the founder, with the help of Usenet respondents, collectively designed a modular package management system.
A package is a unit of code that can be maintained independently from the rest of the operating system but has a standardized interface that allows integration with other packages. To maintain a package is to manage the receipt and review of code contributions from other contributors (called 'upstream maintainers') and 'package' these smaller contributions into a discrete module. A modular package system enables many people who are not physically co-located to contribute to the project by permitting different development activities to be conducted in parallel. From 1994 to 1995, the Free Software Foundation supported the founder to design a technical infrastructure that could handle multilateral contributions. The first whole number release (1.1), announced in June of 1996, had 474 packages.
In the months leading up to the project´s first official release in July of 1997, members debated how to manage the project´s status as a non-commercial entity. Five issues were critical to establishing boundaries with the business world: 1) garnering legitimacy as a non-commercial entity; 2) determining how to logistically distribute their software; 3) raising funds to support the project's legal expenses as a non-profit; 4) distinguishing 'official' copies of Debian from versions modified for commercial purposes;
and 5) determining how, if at all, commercial entities should contribute to the project.
Exploration of these concerns challenged the meaning of 'non-commercial' as it was initially conceived and reflected competing goals among members: to both control their product and yet disseminate it broadly.
We don't want to be in the CD manufacturing business, the import-export business, or the order fulfillment business. We want to get Debian into as many people's hands as we can, for as little money as possible (Posting to Debian Development Mail list, January 17, 1997) .
Project members wanted to acquire the legitimacy associated with shrink wrap software, but
Debian did not have the capital to manufacture a physical distribution. Commercial involvement would help them establish a larger market share than Internet downloads would permit, but they did not want to sell their work.
One proposal to contract with firms to distribute Debian for two dollars was perceived by others as crossing the 'non-commercial' line. Project members questioned whether it was within their charter to ask, mandate, or suggest contributions from firms.
The project leader that informally took over the project when the founder had resigned at the end of 1996 angrily defended improving the commercial appeal of the project in the following post. procedures. Members were torn between reconciling the need to welcome people interested in Debian with the need to protect the project from potentially destructive outsiders.
Mailing list archives indicate that the idea of using a key ring to authenticate contributor identity was proposed by the person who initiated the key ring network in 1994.
I think that at least one of our objectives should be to establish a socio-legal comeback in the case of a malicious developer. This means that we need to verify the real-world identity of the developer somehow. There are several ways to do this, including personal introduction by an existing developer, commercial key-signing, attempting to use PGP web of trust, telephone verification of some kind (Posting to Debian Development mail list, February 28, 1997) .
At the time, there was no formal standard membership process and little preliminary screening. As the informant below describes, the ability to articulate areas for contribution was considered evidence of one's capability to work on the project.
When I applied, I told [the Debian Project Leader], "Here are the packages I want to work on." Back then it was pretty easy and we didn't do the identity check at that point. It was pretty easy to assume that if you knew about Debian back then, you were fairly competent and probably understood the basics of what free software was about. It was a new thing back then -free software particularly. (Sponsored Contributor, Former Volunteer, November 9, 2000) Several mailing list threads discussed ways to secure the identities of contributors, ascertain If anyone could upload to Debian… [twisted facial expression]. We had to guarantee that it actually comes from a trusted source, and that it hasn't been changed along the way. That is how what we achieve this -by signing the packages….First of all it shows that it is from a trusted source. It is signed by a key, which is a developer.
The other thing is it shows that the package hasn't been modified. Like during the upload someone could come and change the package perhaps. (Volunteer Contributor, DPL, June 20, 2003) The Developer Accounts Manager (DAM), authorized to assign new accounts, faced a backlog of people interested in the project and had no real way to ascertain the qualifications of a particular maintainer. A few candidates resigned in frustration.
To avoid losing contributors, some developers began 'sponsoring' member candidates by uploading their packages for them and signing them with their keys. Postings to the list and interviews with informants suggest that the delay in accepting new maintainers was partly due to a heavy workload for volunteers, but also due to their concerns that recent entrants to the project were actually hindering the project more than they were helping.
The problem is they [new maintainers] are not contributing. And some of them are contributing bugs. They are actually adding bad packages. And there was a lot of kicking from old developers about the new people and how they are not reading anything and doing things, it is always old versus new. So we closed being a new maintainer for while because there were so many new packages coming in that they were not helping with anybody else's packaging, they were just uploading their own. So what we were seeing is 1,000 new packages a year and that many more bugs per package showing up. But no change right? It was not getting better, it was getting worse. So we closed it off for a year. Then we sat down and wrote up how we wanted it to work (Sponsored Contributor, March 20, 2001 ).
After doubling in size, project members were frustrated by the growth in bugs relative to contributions from new members, and in particular, the age of bugs that remained unaddressed. New maintainers wanted to work on areas of their interest, not debug existing bugs.
To address the problem of accepting unqualified members, the fourth project leader (newly elected by the powers of the Constitution) made a controversial decision: he closed the project to new maintainers until a new membership process could be designed.
Membership would remain closed until April the following year: almost six months. As Figure 1 shows, Debian's contributor and package growth plateaus.
Debian's new maintainer team is currently not processing requests. The team wanted to resolve some problems they observed with the way Debian maintainership is currently handled, and decided to close new-maintainer until these have been fixed. We are currently working on a new structure for handling new-maintainer requests, and hope to have this finished as soon as possible (Debian Project Leader, Posting to Mail list October 11, 1999 ).
This announcement was followed by a recruiting call outlining criteria for the New
Maintainer Committee (NMC). Developers were invited to email the leader (privately) and were told that committee members would be selected according to the following criteria:
[T]he following guidelines will be used in selecting new members to the newmaintainer team: -needs to have a *strong* opinion for free software -he needs to be able+willing to make long distance phone calls -He needs to know what he's doing, that new people need some guidance, we have to prevent ourselves from trojans etc.
-we need to trust him -more than we trust *any* other active person -He *has to* understand that new-maintainer is *more* than just creating dumb accounts on n machines (New Maintainer Proposal, October 19, 1999) The need to "trust committee members more than any other active person" suggests that the project leader understood that this committee would become future gatekeepers for the project and wanted to have confidence in their philosophical commitment above and beyond their degree of effort on the project.
Designing the Membership Process. While there had always been some identification process before granting new developer accounts, it was not standardized. The committee initially proposed a four-stage process: initial contact (with possible phone interview), checking identification, internship, and acceptance. Identity authentication would ensure that members "know that the person actually exists as the person that they say they are, that there is a known location for that person where they can be spoken to, the person's current
[employment] situation, as well as [the person's] long term contact information must be clear" (New Maintainer Proposal, October 17, 1999) . Project members engaged in this debate recognized that face-to-face meetings could help instill greater collegiality, trust and respect among members.
Maybe the "meet a developer approach" combined with a brief phone interview is better than a lengthy call from some faceless developer. Plus it gives new maintainers an opportunity to have their key signed, which helps build our web of trust, and the personal contact might socialize against flamemongering (I suspect I'll be better behaved on the lists now I've met a few of you at ALS, for example ;) (Posting to Debian Project Mail list, October 18, 1999) .
Interestingly enough, the developer quoted above felt that he was better behaved himself now that he had met people on the project.
The 'internship period' would allow applicants to prove themselves by testing the candidates´ technical competence, knowledge of organizational procedures, collegiality and commitment, and philosophical agreement with the principles of the project.
It [the internship] allows us a good method to help a new maintainer with his new work and teach him about the Debian system (both technical and organizational).
It allows us to get to know the person: is he responsive to bug reports or other requests, is he able to produce a quality product, and also very important: does he agree with our philosophy? (New Maintainer Proposal, October 19, 1999 However, the new maintainer process did not reopen before the year's end.
The final membership process adopted required not only identity verification through face-to-face exchange of keys, but sponsorship by an existing member, more packages, worked on more popular packages, had shorter tenure on the project, and had more ties in the network, were more likely to become members of the NMC.
Our findings show that technical contributions are predictive up to a point, but degree centrality has a significant and positive influence on leadership. In Fleming and
Waguespack's study (2003) Narrowing the Pipeline. Some members felt that the membership requirements established by the NMC were too onerous and undermined the freedoms Debian espoused.
One informant expressed his gratitude at having joined the project before the new maintainer process was in place.
Raising the threshold too high, or even just the perceived notion, whether justified or not, that many NMs [New Maintainers] are unskilled, could make Debian more and more like an elitist society……As for me, I am just glad that I became a Debian developer over 3 years ago, long before this was even an issue. (Posting to Debian Project, January 7, 2001) However, the process would become stricter yet. When processing candidates for membership, Application Managers found that many applicants were no longer interested or responsive. The head of the NMC proposed narrowing the pipeline of candidates by requiring applicants to obtain a sponsor before submitting their application.
An increasing number of applicants are either not serious about joining Debian and contributing to the project or not well prepared for the new maintainer process yet. A proposal is made to require all potential developers to maintain the recommendation of an existing developer…Those not very serious in joining are thus not able to apply in the first place (Changes to the New Maintainer System, February 5, 2001 ).
This change, accepted as a means for members of the NMC to save time, effectively eliminated the possibility of newcomers without prior attachment to a network incumbent.
One project member (in the top 5% of maintainers in terms of the number of packages managed), running to become the fifth leader argued that the difficulties that underlay the new maintainer process were the product of Debian's unusual success.
The biggest frustrations I see with Debian are, in fact, all related to this success. We have more developers than ever, more packages soaking more bandwidth to mirror than ever, more open bugs than ever, and our user community is broadening into areas where the criteria for success may be different. This puts enormous pressure on our organization, forcing us to continue to evolve…. (DPL Candidate Platform, February 23, 2001) The winner of the 2001 election also proposed "adding more structure to the project", namely to improve the new maintainer process. He noted that the NMC was under incredible pressure to protect Debian from 'Trojans' and that the current process was still not robust enough to handle further growth.
[W]e all have the same permissions to upload packages, we all have just as much right to screw up the archive as anyone else. In there lies the problem. Maintainer count is on the rise all the time. It may not seem to be a problem now, but increasing administrative and security work to keep this increase on a good footing is not going to remain easy (well, it isn't easy now). Stopping developer entrance all together is not an alternative either. Some may argue that this makes Debian less "open". Well, I don't think Debian is closed at all…..Now I know this isn't the same as having one's own packages, and that sponsorship is not turning out to be the godsend that we had hoped. However, allowing more levels of maintainship will likely make it easier for people to contribute. (Leadership Platform, February 20, 2001) The DPL's approach to keeping Debian open, but managing its boundaries, was to create differentiated levels of access to the code base, a change that was not implemented by the NMC. By analyzing the distribution of degrees, or the number of people developers have met, we can determine if the Debian network is a random network. If the network grows randomly then we would expect the degree distribution to approximate a Poisson distribution (Albert and Barabasi, 2002) . If the network grows through a process of preferential attachment, where each new node is more likely to attach to a node with a higher degree, then it may follow a power law degree distribution (Albert and Barabasi, 2002) . Networks with a power law degree distribution are scale-free in that a large number of nodes have very few degrees and a small number of nodes have a large number of degrees. Figure 2 reports the degree distribution of the Debian network. As an illustration, 77% of developers had met only 1 or 2 people in 1998 and 6% had met over 10. In 2002, 50% of developers had met 1 or 2 people and 4.8% had met over 25. Table 1 shows that the average degree of developers, stable from 1997-1999, increased to 3.64 in 2000 with a standard deviation of 4.67. This was much higher than the standard deviation in the two previous years. After 2000, the average degree of the network and its standard deviation increase every year. If the network is scale-free, a plot of the log number of degrees on the x axis and the log of the number of developers on the y axis will result in a straight line. DPL, June 20, 2003 .
Analyzing Network Expansion
It can now take six months or more for a new maintainer to become a developer 13 .
Candidates are recommended to ask Debian developers to write a letter of reference for 
Discussion
The social network of Debian developers, as captured by the keyring data, has a pragmatic purpose: identity verification. The growing popularity of Linux in general and Debian Linux in particular created a practical problem that may be present in other types of distributed knowledge producing communities (David and Foray, 2002) . The explosive unregulated growth of developers led project members to fine tune a new social structure that could help ensure that new member's skills, goals, and ideology were in line with that of the collective.
Despite the fact that some researchers have argued that open source projects do not rely on trust (Gallivan, 2001) , prior research has shown that trust is critical for virtual teams (Jarvenpaa and Leidner, 1999 ) and this case is no exception. As Nohria and Eccles predicted (1992) , "there may be minimum ratio of face to face to electronically mediated exchange that is vital to maintain in order for a network organizations to work effectively" (1992: 290) . A crisis occurred when the project no longer felt that it could adequately protect its boundaries and closed its doors to new potential members. This led to the construction of the NMC and the articulation of a membership process that institutionalized the key ring.
In this research, we showed that meeting people face-to-face and acquiring a This research also shows how a reinforcing cycle of preferential attachment helps sustain a scale invariant distribution. Previous research on the evolution of networks in the biotechnology industry (Powell et al, 2002; Owen-Smith et al, 2003) found that actors in this field had a preference for diversity as opposed to incumbents or like others (homophily).
The recombinative nature of innovation in the biotechnology field demands a constant quest for new partners and ideas (Powell et al, 2002 What is at stake here is the entire range of mechanisms that will facilitate interpersonal and inter-organizational transactions, given the new conditions for knowledge transactions and exchanges: increasing specialization, increasingly asymmetrical distribution of information and assessment capabilities, ever-greater anonymity among interlocutors and ever-more opportunities for forgery of identity.
Clearly new methods need to be devised to "Certify" the knowledge circulating on the Internet….. (David and Foray, 2002: 17) If distributed, pluralistic knowledge producing communities that cross or exist outside of established institutional boundaries are to survive, innovations in trust and reliability mechanisms will likely continue to emerge. More research on mechanisms that help carve a protected and common informational space for collaboration is needed to understand not only their emergence, but their contribution to project security and effectiveness.
Such research should attend to the legal platform required for such work to flourish as well as the socio-technical space for collaboration. Prior to reaching the point where growth created membership and boundary challenges for Debian, all potential contributors were assured that the work created by Debian members would remain non-proprietary and that the Debian project was committed to being non-commercial 18 . The selection of people who share the project's non-commercial philosophy is one way in which project boundaries with the commercial world become defined. However, intellectual property remains a constant source of concern for community managed projects like Debian. The second level of boundary management occurs at the code acceptance level. New challenges with regards to derivative works, proprietary modules and drivers often inspire division among members as to where the non-commercial boundary of Debian falls.
It is argued that in response to challenges to the norms of open science, well-defined communities of academic practice and credit are giving way to much larger co-owned intellectual property resource pools (Hellstrom, 2003) . If academic research and commercial research are forging new areas of interdependence, particularly in the biomedical field, then scoping rights of access and belonging to emerging research opportunities will be a future challenge. David and Foray acknowledge as much in their prescient analysis of knowledge communities:
The potential for producing and reproducing knowledge will become greater as a community expands, but then so will the costs of data search, the risk of congestion and anonymity amongst members, which can in turn, represent a source of acute problems of trust. (David and Foray, 2002: 8) The problems of trust described by David and Foray (2002) are very real and the design of new mechanisms to manage them will co-evolve with the social networks that underlie knowledge producing communities. Note:: The graphs report the scatter plot of the log-log degree distribution and a regression line, with the shaded area representing the 95% confidence interval around the predicted value (the straight line that we would expect to find according to the scale-free model). 
Nodes = 212
Note: In this visualization of the main component of the social network of Debian Developers, the color of the nodes indicates the year the developer joined the community. Gold = 1996 or earlier; green = 1997; red = 1998; blue = 1999 . The size of the node measures the number of package maintained by the developer. 
